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THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

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**PANEL 2**

**WITNESS:**

**GENERAL LANCE SMITH,  
COMMANDER,  
U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND**

*Transcript by:  
Federal News Service  
Washington, D.C.*

MR. DAWSON: If the commission college could take their seats?

General Smith, welcome. I am Rhett Dawson, and I have the great privilege of being the acting chair of today's hearing. Our chairman, Arnold Punaro, was unavoidably taken off and had to do other commitments, and so I have the honor of wielding his gavel and also making a few remarks before we get a chance to get under way here.

So, General Lance Smith – I'll introduce to all of you – is the commander of the United States Joint Forces Command. General Smith is a highly decorated Air Force officer who has enjoyed a long and distinguished military career. And just like General Jones, whose testimony we just received, General Smith has dual responsibilities – one as commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command and the other as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, something I really want to know much more about.

General Smith's NATO responsibility includes leading the alliance's structures, forces, capabilities and doctrines to improve the military effectiveness of the alliance and its partner nations in direct support of NATO's global security interests. He is responsible for overseeing joint training and doctrine development within the alliance, as well as for the joint doctrine for and direction of NATO's schools and colleges. As commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, General Smith is responsible for maximizing future and present military capabilities of the United States by leading the transformation of joint forces through enhanced joint concept development and experimentation, identifying joint requirements, advancing interoperability, conducting joint training, and providing U.S. forces and capabilities that are ready to fight.

The United States Joint Force Command is a force of more than 1.16 million active duty and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.

We look forward to hearing General Smith's testimony on a broad array of issues that are before the commission, and particular his views on, first, the difficulties he encounters in accessing ready and highly capable reserve component personnel and units, and how these problems can be overcome; second, how the Joint Forces Command's process for measuring readiness of reserve component personnel in units is working, and how it can be improved. Third, what are the unique capabilities the reserve component brings to the total force, and what capabilities should be enhanced to meet future requirements? Fourth, how can we better qualify the reserve component to operate in a joint environment to include joint training in preparation for mobilizations and deployments? And finally, what steps can be taken to promote an integrated total force.

A number of witnesses have told the commission that the mobilization process needs significant improvements and changes if it's going to work in the future. In our San Diego hearing, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Plunkett, 2nd Battalion, 156th Infantry,

Louisiana National Guard, called the mobilization process, quote, "inefficient, wasteful of time and energy, and oftentimes pure torture," close quote.

We will welcome General Smith's thoughts on the mobilization in process, and any suggestions he has for how to improve it. And given General Smith's NATO responsibilities, we would be very interested in hearing his input on whether allies offer examples or approaches on how best to task, organize, train, equip, compensate, mobilize and support the reserve component to meet our national security requirements now and in the future.

General Smith, thank you for rearranging your busy schedule to participate today. We are grateful for your presence and thankful for your outstanding leadership and service to our country. Now General, if you've got an opening statement you would like to make, we would sure like to hear it.

Thank you.

Want to flip that –

GEN. SMITH: How's that? It was already on.

Thank you, Chairman, and the commissioners. Good to see some friends that I haven't seen in while out there. I appreciate the opportunity to engage in the discussion. I think what you all are doing is critical to our ability to conduct the missions that I think we're going to be called upon to conduct for some time.

As you know, as the primary force provider, I couldn't even begin to do that role or have that role without access, visibility and use of the reserve component. It has become an integral part of how we supply forces to the combatant commanders in the field, and it's not just Central Command. As you know, EUCOM has forces in KFROR as well, and they currently have a Guard or a Reserve brigade that's over there now.

I work through four components as part of Joint Forces Command – Air Combat Command under General Ron Keyes, U.S. Army Forces Command under General Dan McNeil at Fort McPherson, Fleet Forces Command under General Nathaman in Norfolk, and then Marine Forces Command in Norfolk as well, under Lieutenant General Rusty Blackman.

And so as we go through the discussions, I would just ask that you remember that that's how we operate, that everything that I do is through my service components. And they bridge the gap with the services on how we go about finding the forces, training the forces, and then supplying the forces, both active and reserve components to the combatant commanders.

I think we have made significant improvement over time. I'm not sure when Colonel Plunkett's experiences – what – when he was describing it. There was a time,

certainly in the early stages of the current conflict that we -- conflicts that we're in when notification time was as low as -- or counted in weeks rather than months. We've reached a point now where, on average, a unit has about 14 months of warning to reset, train and get ready to go to battle.

It is somewhat different as in the individual augmentee business, and you may or may not know that Joint Forces Command just took over the mission of joint individual augmentee manning and provision on the 1st of October of this year, and our primary goal is going to be to do the same things with individual augmentees that we did with units, and that's push the notification time out further and further until we think we can have the kind of training, the kind of predictability, and those things that are necessary for both the active and the Reserve component. And I do think it is significantly more important that that predictability is out there for the Reserve component because of their family differences, their employee requirements, and the like.

So that is our goal, and we can talk about that a little bit, although we are still in the process of figuring out just all the ways that we'll go about doing that mission.

We've worked towards an integrated total force. Frankly, when I look at how we're going to provide forces to the combatant commander, I don't identify between an active force and a reserve force. We simply look at what are the requirements of the combatant commander and who can best provide those. And I would say pretty confidently, certainly from my last job as the deputy commander of Central Command and on the receiving end of the forces we got, once they got into battle, you could not identify a reserve unit from an active unit in the performance in combat.

We also rely on the Reserves and the Guard in our basic missions of trying to do the JFCOM mission. We have authorized some 900, almost a thousand reserve forces, and we're manned -- we have about 669, 200 of which are generally deployed worldwide someplace, mostly in theater. But we have a very interesting mission for many of our reserve components, and that's to man our standing Joint Force headquarters, which we hold in -- hold for the combatant commanders to be able to go rapidly, deploy into the theater and set up command control structure. And those people have deployed into Katrina with their active component counterparts, into Pakistan for the earthquake relief. They were a primary -- the primary, early on, force generation to set up Task Force Paladin, which was the counter-IED task force in Afghanistan, and then we have used those forces to set up the counter-IED division within ISAF in Afghanistan.

So they're busy, and they are critical to how we perform our daily mission in Joint Forces Command.

Interestingly, we have recently had approval for some 200-plus reservists to help us with our NATO job as well. So I have got a number that are committed to allied command transformation, and we will be working with them to develop just exactly where we're going with our tasks and how we can best use the capabilities of the reserves in the NATO mission.

We are committed to improving the way we do business, but we know there are some challenges out there. We are working those challenges, not the least of which is visibility into the force, and that's an issue with the active component as well as the reserve component, and the challenges are somewhat greater with Guard forces as they operate between their Title 32 and their Title 10 responsibilities. But we think we've got some answers to that through DRS and some of the other systems that we are currently in the process of working with OSD to implement. And we think that will help us do our job better as the force provider.

There are other training initiatives that we can talk about that I think have great – a very positive aspect of how we will work together and ensure that the forces are properly trained.

I was recently in the theater in Iraq, and I will go to Afghanistan the first week in December, and in both cases to look at the training and notification and all the issues that revolve around how we identify and then train and deploy forces into theater. And my experience was very, very mixed, from folks that had lots of notification and excellent training for the mission that they were going to go do to folks that had less than a week's notice and found themselves in Baghdad without really knowing exactly they were going to go do and without the requisite training.

So there continue to be issues out there. Most of them are anecdotal, but there are a lot of anecdotes, and my job is to try and go about fixing that and working through our services and the components to do that.

So I'm pleased to be here and talk about some of those things and answer any questions that I can for you. I'm accompanied by two of our great folks that work with Joint Forces Command, Major General John McLaren, who – there he is – who is our deputy commander of our Joint Warfighting Center. He's a reservist, and he's the kind of reservist that you just want to have. I mean, his prior job prior to coming here was as the Iraqi assistant team commander, so he was in Baghdad working with our forces as they put U.S. forces or embedded them into the Iraqi forces. And so he brings to us an incredible amount of experience that we see the results of his efforts, knowledge and experience every day in our Joint Warfighting Center.

And then Colonel Barb Hearst (sp), who has a similar background, and she works in our J5 shop, our plan shop, and she works the interagency piece. And she also has a background in working with military support to civil affairs and civil issues and is used to working in the interagency, so she brings with us, or into the command, a whole lot of experience that we might otherwise not be able to get. And that's how we use our reserve component forces. And as I mentioned, they are integral to everything we do. And I look forward to your questions.

MR. DAWSON: Well, great. Thank you, General Smith.

I'm going to ask what I think is maybe a question that would only demonstrate, more widely than I'd like, the ignorance about how you think about transformation. What are you transforming from, and where are you going? Is this a transformation intended to get people out of a Cold War mentality and into a global war on terror mentality? Or is it more granular than that, trying to get a more dynamic, agile force that can be more effective against a broader array of threats?

GEN. SMITH: It is clearly the latter. We are going from a threat-based force that was focused on a static, reactive force and – you know, depending on which hat I'm wearing, whether it's my NATO hat or my U.S. hat, the answer is similar but can be different. But we go from a force that was built and designed to operate on the North German plains, massive force on force, attrition-based – you know, to just kill as many people as you can and move the line forward. It was victory-based. I mean, the goal was to go plant a flag on somebody else's territory – to a force that is more capability-based, since we don't know exactly where the threat is or will be in the long term, more deployable, more flexible, more agile, sustainable in the theater, but with long deployment lines, and one that is able to operate at a much – a high-intensity level, but at a much lower level of conflict, and as we look at the building of force to be able to fight the global war on terror in the long term.

Now the interesting part about that is how you balance that with the requirement to still be able to fight a conventional battle if need be. And so balancing those forces is the issue, and not forgetting that we have the latter capability to deal with as well. And we do that through working with the services, and really taking guidance from the secretary of Defense's office and the executive branch on how we go about balancing those forces.

MR. DAWSON: Okay.

I will defer to my colleagues here, but I would like to get back to that question.

Commissioner Brownlee?

LES BROWNLEE: Thank you.

General Smith, welcome, and let me just take the opportunity to thank you for your service to the nation, as well as those both in uniform and civilian attire who have accompanied you here. I thank all you for your service to the nation as well as your families.

GEN. SMITH: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

MR. BROWNLEE: We all know what sacrifices and all you've been through in the past few years, and it's not been an easy life that you've led.

Let me ask you, if I can, a question about mobilization statutes to laws that govern mobilization of our reserve components. And right now, that law states that service members in reserve components can be mobilized for 24 consecutive months, but the policy that the department follows is probably what they have supposed is more the intent of Congress, which allows for 24 cumulative months. Otherwise you'd be able to mobilize for 23 months, 29 days, demobilize them, and bring them back the following day and do it again. So departments follow that policy.

How do you think that policy should be read, recognizing that a lot of members of the reserve components have used up their 24 cumulative months and were going to be looking at having to go back to the well again in some way for this continuing war on terror?

GEN. SMITH: Well, I – it is an issue, but it is not a huge issue. It is oftentimes that the policies within the department or the red lines that we use within the services that are more problematic, but we're able to get back at those in many cases. For instance, the secretary just gave us – well, let me back up. There was another interpretation of policy or different policy that says that once they were called up, no matter how long, for a contingency that we couldn't use them again within that five-year dwell period that they had, which caused us in several instances -- and particularly in the case of five Marine battalions where they had not used up their 24 months, but because we had used them shortly after 9/11 – they weren't available to us. Now we recently went back to the secretary, and he authorized us to use them to take advantage of that cumulative time that wasn't spent before. So that was more a restriction, I think, than the 24 months.

Now, we would like very much to move into a force generation policy where we can accept that 24 months, but take full advantage of it. Because of the way we generated forces early on in this process, it has limited us from doing it the way we would like to do it, and that's by unit, and cause us to have to go through the cross-leveling piece. And therefore, you have units with many folks that have got their 24 months or something, you know, building on that that makes them not so useful to us, and then you have other members of the unit that don't. So we end up pulling people out of units and cobbling together other units.

So I don't think it's the congressional – the Title X law that is as restrictive as how we went about applying it early on. And it is one of the things that we would like to fix. And the issue is or the challenge is how do we get back to where we're using units instead of individuals with that 24-month time.

MR. BROWNLEE: Okay. The Army right now has 130 days of mobilization and training for reserve components that they call up. We've heard from some of the senior commanders that they consider this 130 days to be essential, while as the chairman mentioned, some others that we've heard from consider that a lot of it's a waste of time and could be done at home station and not have to be away from home to do it. What's your view about that, that kind of mobilization and training period?

GEN. SMITH: Well, that is more of a service responsibility than it is mine. My responsibility is to make sure that when we do provide them to the combatant commander that they meet the requirements.

Now, having said that, I've heard similar concerns when I talk to the people in theater or the people en route. And so what we have done recently with our components is gone back and looked at the training process for both the active component and the reserve component, and we will be coming up with recommendations on how we can improve on that.

Now, often times, the ones that you hear that from that the time is not well spent are folks that have been over there once or twice before. And indeed, that is probably true for some. But there is also something to be said for sending the entire unit through the kind of training together. And many of those in the unit have not been into Iraq or Afghanistan or KFOR and they do need the training – that 130 days. So I don't think we'll ever get it perfect, but there probably are ways to get at training them at home station more. We are working some of those issues within Joint Forces Command. Our joint national training capability, as we expand that, I think that will help to some degree.

As we expand our joint knowledge deployment and distribution capability, which is websites that have training programs on there that can be evaluated and assessed. I think as we implement those and get them deeper into the Guard and reserve and the active force, we will better be able to look at our field training and those other things, and better be able to evaluate what can be done at home station and what needs to be done in the field. Currently, we do a lot of language and cultural training, for instance, at Ft. Riley for the transition teams as we send them forward. We're developing and have developed several programs that might get at that or will get at that through distributed learning. And perhaps that will help either reduce some of the training in the field or it will allow us to concentrate on other things that are more important or equally important.

So we are in the process of really taking a look at how we in Joint Forces Command can best support the services as they try to develop the right scheme for how best to manage field training, home training, and the like.

MR. BROWNLEE: General Smith, considering that we have now recognized that the reserve components are an operational force as opposed to a strategic force, are there any other major policy or statutory changes that you believe we should consider on this commission – with respect to the reserve components, of course?

GEN. SMITH: Well, I personally think the move – and it's not something I physically look at, the move from strategic to operational – I think that's positive, because I think it makes for a much stronger, a much better trained, and a much better equipped force by its nature. And it doesn't always look that way, but I think it makes for a much better integrated force because we drive ourselves to a position where the services want to and have to train to the capability, so that the unit on your flank is just as good as the active unit or the other unit that trained to that capability.

I am not concerned really about the statutory piece of that. I think we can operate within the statutory limits that we have. Oftentimes, as I mentioned earlier, we are more constrained by our internal policies than we are the statutory limitations. And those are always, by the way, designed for improved quality of life of the troops. They're all for good reasons. And as long as we can – when we have to – access those troops that are constrained by internal policy, then I think we can operate okay. So I see no requirement for major statutory change in that regard as far as my or our access to those troops.

I will say, as we go from trying to use the unit to get back to unit mobilization, there may be a one-time requirement that we take a look at those statutory rules and come to the Congress to see if it is constraining and if we can get relief. But I don't know that that's a requirement yet.

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you.

GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir.

MR. BROWNLEE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Rowley.

WADE ROWLEY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you very much for spending the time with us this morning. To testify before us, this is very helpful to the commission. I'd like to talk a little bit about homeland security, which I understand is a little out of your lane, but the recommendations I'm sure you have based on your experience would be very helpful to us.

The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina Lessons Learned report makes a number of specific recommendations. Specifically, two points it makes really affect the reserve forces. Number one, the Department of Defense should ensure that the transformation from the National Guard is focuses on increased integration with active duty forces for homeland security plans and activities. And number two, in addition to the National Guard, the other reserve components of the military services should modify their organization and training to include a priority mission to prepare and deploy in support of homeland security missions.

Now, having said that, and factoring in an increased expectation for the use of the other reserve forces besides the National Guard, if the reserve components make homeland security a priority mission, what effects do you see on the availability and readiness of the reserve capabilities that regional commanders rely on other than NORTHCOM?

GEN. SMITH: I would hope that we would not separate those forces out. I mean, that is part of the force pool that we must have to be able to support the combatant commander needs around the world. But having said that, we always have very good units around the country that I think are capable of meeting almost any homeland security

requirement other than the catastrophic huge kind – I mean, global war – that I can't imagine in the near term.

So as we, for instance, for this hurricane season earmarked some 25,000 forces to be available in the event that we had a Katrina-like emergency, it was not really very difficult. Now, how well they're trained to do those missions, I think, is an issue that we need to continue to look at, but it is – if you are trained for your military mission, then for the most part I think you're prepared to be able to go do most of the things that would be expected of us in a Katrina-like emergency. Now, what we did at the request of NORTHCOM in the instance of this season was to make sure that those forces that were identified or earmarked, that they knew they were earmarked so that they could do individual training and that they would be expected to go through some level of training in posse comitatas and some of the other rules and limitations that the Guard understands very well but the active and reserve force don't always.

And so, I think there is a way to do this to ensure that we're capable of managing the force to be able to meet any need we have in homeland security without taking them out of the force pool. And that's what we're trying to do, and I think we successfully did it this year, but we'll have to go do our lessons learned after this, and hopefully we won't have to execute. But in any event, we'll look at what we learned from this experience and then improve how we would do it at any other time.

MR. ROWLEY: Okay, thank you very much. Mr. Chairman?

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Lewis.

PATRICIA LEWIS: Welcome and thank you for your service. You touched a few minutes ago on cross-leveling, and I'd just like to ask specifically if there are any steps that Joint Forces Command has taken to mitigate both the need for services to cross-level and the effects of that practice?

GEN. SMITH: Let me first of all say that cross-leveling isn't always a bad thing. One of the beauties of how we've got the military arranged is that you're able to tailor forces to do a specific mission. And in that case, cross-leveling is pretty good. Now, what I think your concern is – and it's a legitimate one; it's ours as well – that the breaking apart of units and cobbling them together and not having the command chain, the bonding, all those things that go to make a cohesive military unit before they go in into conflict.

We are really looking at trying to take a look at this thing holistically so that we can come up with a plan on how to get away from cross-leveling and go back into the unit mobilization. Now, the issue is how do we go about transitioning from where we are today where we have used up a great deal of the force to how we implement that process, and how much do we have to come back for new authorities and how do we actually go about doing it in transitioning? And that's what we're looking at right now.

Short of that, we have – given the constraints of the current policies, it is very difficult for us to get to a situation where we're not cross-leveling, unless for some period of time, we just don't use the reserve component, and let it build back up to where – I think our first unit will have their five years dwell time in late 2008, which means they couldn't really be used until 2009. But then we would like to get back to being able to use the unit as a unit. The problematic part of it is that as you know, many of those units have great American men and women that have volunteered to go back, so we've got to be able to look at those units and see just how much the units are available.

We will never reach perfection. I think any unit, whether it's an active unit or a Guard unit or a reserve unit is going to have some percentage of people that are not available to them, and so there is going to be some level of cross-leveling. We would like to keep it to something on the order of 15 percent rather than some of the times when we're having to go to as much as 40 or 50 percent. But we care about that, as the Guard cares about it. I mean, if you signed up to go to do something with the Paducah unit and you find yourself with a Peoria unit, that's not what you signed up for, and we acknowledge that and we are trying to work through that.

MS. LEWIS: We have heard that as an issue as we've been conducting our review, and it's a concern to a number of service members.

GEN. SMITH: We understand it. And the fact is, what's happening right now is because we have used up so many of those forces, the active component is filling many of those missions that we would otherwise like the reserve component to do, especially in the combat support and combat service support areas. And so, I think we have an opportunity here to take a look at how we can transition back to what we would like to do, and I think most people would like to do – certainly, General Blama (sp) – and that's get back to unit mobilization.

MS. LEWIS: Along another line, I noticed in your prepared remarks that as a joint force provider, you feel you have to have visibility on all National Guard operations. I wonder if you could just comment a little bit on your relationship with NORTHCOM. Some of us did have the opportunity to go out and learn a bit about NORTHCOM and meet with those folks, but could you just please describe a bit of your relationship and interaction with the other components?

GEN. SMITH: We have routine interaction with NORTHCOM, and our relationship is very good. Admiral Keating and I met not too long ago just to discuss the sorts of issues that we're talking about right now. And actually, we did it in anticipation of some of the issues that have been out there – the expectation or the concerns you'll recall of North Korea shooting a missile, the hurricane season, and all the things that NORTHCOM worries about on a regular basis, and how we can best provide the forces they need to be able to conduct their mission. We exercise together, and in fact, we help them set up their exercises. They use our joint national training capability. They're one of the nodes that are out there ready and certified. So we are completely integrated in the planning stages and the training, and in the execution, if you call our earmarking of the

forces that they required to be able to get through or be prepared for a hurricane season that certainly was expected to be much more robust than it has turned out so far, thankfully.

MS. LEWIS: Fortunately.

GEN. SMITH: Fortunately.

MS. LEWIS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have other questions. But I'll let my colleagues go.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Eckles.

LARRY ECKLES: Good morning, General Smith. Thank you for spending your valuable time with the commission this morning. GAO recently reported that certain army support skills are in increasingly short supply for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. GAO also found that DOD lacks data on skilled individuals available for future deployments, and it has not comprehensively assessed the courses of action that make more personnel available for future rotations. General Jones, this morning, testified that we need to focus on those high-demand, short supply skills to be sure that we have them when we need them. Which support skills have you seen in high demand in order to meet the pace of operations among the ground forces, and what strategies is the Joint Forces Command using to ensure these skill sets are available for future operations?

GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. I mean, that is clearly an issue in some of the skill sets. And you all know as well as I did, I'm an old Vietnam guy, and we did a lot of this intentionally. After Vietnam, we went out and we put certain skill sets into the reserves to ensure that if we went to war again that the reserves were going to be part of that. And I don't think that anticipated the kind of war that we're conducting right now, where almost all of your – a great portion of your civil affairs folks are in the reserve component, a lot of your military intelligence, a lot of your engineering capability – those things that end up being critical to us in the kind of war that we're fighting.

So the skills that we need that we are particularly dealing with right now are military police, combat brigades – and military police, there are sort of two kinds. I mean, one are the internment folks that are really specifically trained to be able to manage places like Camp Bucca, Abu Ghirab when we had that, and Camp Suzie. And those are – I think we've got three active battalions and six reserve battalions. And you can see if the active component is on a one-to-one dwell and the reserve component is on a one-to-five dwell, we can't meet the requirements over there, so we end up doing things that we don't like to do in lieu of training to put people in those special skill sets.

We were just talking with General Corelli yesterday, and it is a concern that military police – not specifically in the internment area, but military police in general. He doesn't believe, given what we're trying to do in Baghdad that in lieu of forces are

right for that. So the military police is a very critical capability that we need to have access to, and they have to be military policemen, not people that are trained in lieu of.

Military intelligence – I mean, all of you know that we have had issues with that. A lot of our linguists are in the Guard and reserve. A lot of our interrogators – and we've had some routine issues with that. Our engineer brigades, the Army has specific capabilities that really can't be done in many cases or aren't done by the Sea Bees and the Red Horse teams of the Navy and the Air Force. The Marines have some capability in that regard, but it's organic, and they take them with them, so they aren't available for specific combat engineering, and all those units are in the reserve.

There are other skill sets. Certainly, aviation is always a requirement and will continue to be a requirement in this kind of war, especially helicopters. And those end up being in short supply often times. Lots of other capabilities that are out there – full-motion video, SIGINT, are requirements that we're having challenges trying to make sure that we can meet the requirements of the combatant commander. But the ones that I mentioned up front are the primary ones.

MR. ECKLES: Thank you for your comments. That's all I have, Mr. Chair.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Sherrard.

JAMES SHERRARD: Good morning, General Smith. It's really nice seeing you here. Thank you for taking the time, my friend. Can you help me out here, help us on the commission? We just came from some hearings in San Diego and we heard – some anecdotal information is what some would say – but I would tell you it was very disturbing as I sat and listened to it, going back and remembering some of the days in the past where I actually sat in another chair of how the process got to a particular unit. So could you share with us exactly how the process flows from the time of you getting a request for forces and then where are those decisions made that eventually lead to a specific unit being the one identified to be called?

GEN. SMITH: Certainly. As you know, the combatant commanders – well, let me back into the process completely. We work Iraq and Afghanistan by rotations. And so, for the '07-'09 rotation, which starts – I think the first unit goes in February and it works itself all the way through '07, and then they're over there through '08 and '09, depending on when they arrive – for that rotation, we have already gone through and identified the likely units that we will recommend. And those have, in most cases, been approved, and we take that entire rotation of whatever the requirement is, in this case, 21-some brigade combat team equivalents. And we go through the normal process of developing a TipFid and a rotation schedule and all of those things. So that happens as a matter of the adapted planning process, not unlike the deliberate planning process, except a bit more dynamic and short-term. And so we have a document out there that lays out who is going when that TransCOM is able to use and the units are able to plan for.

The request for forces piece is outside of that. And so, when General Abizaid has a requirement that is not going to be fulfilled by that TipFid, he sends his request for forces to the chairman or to the joint staff – (audio break, tape flip) – challenges, whatever his request may be. But in any event, he makes that request; it gets validated by the joint staff; and they send it down to us and they say, okay, you guys, go fill it. It's a valid request.

And let's say it's an MP to battalion. And so we go down into our service components and we have daily meetings. There are weekly BTCs where everybody attends, including the joint staff, and generally speaking, Central Command or the combatant commander that has made the request. And we refine exactly what it is he wants; we spend a lot of time on the telephone trying to figure out who has got the forces that he has requested. And then, we take a look at what is available out there, and our Army component comes in and says, okay, we've got this MP battalion. It's been back in the States for three months, but it will be ready again in nine months. The Air Force says we've got these guys and they've been back for twelve months and they're available now if you need them. The Navy, same thing; the Marines, the same thing.

And so they go look at all the criteria that they need to be able to say whether the unit is available, what the readiness of that unit is, and whether it can meet the requirements of Central Command. And then, we go through a – I won't call it a negotiation process because that sounds like we're fighting each other for it – but I mean, there was a time when we sort of played Go Fish on this thing – you know, who has really got an MP battalion and I'm not going to show my card. But that has all gone away. The collaboration between the services is really spectacular on this.

So the services lean forward, they say okay, this is what we've got, and we go and try to pick in concert with the combatant commander and with the joint staff what the best unit is to do that. We identify that unit and we say okay, it's the – well, make it up – the 113<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion from Ft. Wherever. And we send that recommendation up to the chairman, and he says, okay, I got it. Very seldom do we have the services come in and reclama, but they have the opportunity to reclama in which case it would normally go to a tank, which means that JCS would sit there and discuss what the best option is and then we reach general agreement and we take it into the secretary of Defense and he approves that request for forces. Or, if the reclama is sufficient that he looks at it and says, no, I want you to go back and find a different solution or look harder, then we go back and do that. And so, it is a very – it sounds complex, but it is a very inclusive and collaborative process. And generally speaking, and when I say generally, I mean at the 98 percent level. I can barely think of anything that has gone – and I won't say it hasn't happened, but during my tenure – that has gone to SecDef without general agreements amongst the services that that unit is the right unit to go.

MR. SHERRARD: Well, as I said, this particular case that we were talking about was quite disturbing in terms of the way it was presented to us. It was a cross-leveling process. A unit was called – this was an Army aviation request – without assets. The unit they went to didn't have any assets, so then they had to go back to their home unit to

get assets. And it just didn't make any sense at all in terms of process. And you've done an excellent job of lying out how the process should have loaded. It appeared to me as I heard the individual talking about their particular case, it was really a matter – something happened, in my opinion, at the service level – of the wrong unit being identified and/or no one told the leadership that we have these unique shortfalls, and you should understand that, so I'm delighted to hear that.

And then, just one last question because –

GEN. SMITH: Let me – can I respond to that?

MR. SHERRARD: Sure, yes, you may.

GEN. SMITH: What happens sometimes – and that gets into the requirement for much greater visibility into the capabilities of various units that we don't have right now. And so, as we build towards DRS, the defense requirements – whatever DRS stands for – but it gives you visibility ultimately, I think, all the way down to the unit level – I mean, to the individual level, what that person's training is, what his capabilities are, what her readiness is and availability are - and then across the active and reserve component. We don't have that visibility all the time, so a lot of the issues that you raised are unknown to forces command, for instance, and the way they find this stuff out is through a phone call down to the unit – and they say we're showing you as the CH-47s, and that's when we find out that four of them are down for something or that the crews aren't qualified in night vision goggles, or the like. And we need to get at that.

Reporting is not always good. Guard and reserve units – when they're not federalized – they report their status on a quarterly basis. And so, even though we're supposed to change, when the status changes, that doesn't mean that it always does. And so, we don't have great visibility into exactly what the skills and capabilities are of a unit.

Now, what we've worked with our components to do – we recognize that, because it came up when we were trying to get CH-47s for Pakistan, and we found that – it took us a week to find out who could operate above 12,000 feet, who had night vision goggle training, et cetera, et cetera. And so what came out of that is our component said, well, we're probably asking the wrong questions, because when we report, we don't report on those things. We report supply, equipment, training, and personnel. And unless we, JFCOM, or the combatant commanders tell them what they need to report to us, we can't get that access. So we're in the process of re-looking what we're asking for and what ought to be reported in the readiness reporting. But ultimately – and we're already reporting into DRS – but it will be a while before it is instituted throughout all the components and all the Guard and the Reserve. But that's why those sorts of things happen, and that's what we're working towards is ensuring we know those issues beforehand, and we don't right now.

MR. SHERRARD: Well, thank you very much, and we're fortunate to have you sitting in that chair, because you know well from having lived it throughout your career,

but in particular in your last assignment prior to your current one, you know exactly the things that you're being asked to go do and the types of forces we have to present. And as I said, we could not be more fortunate having someone of your talent and abilities sitting in the chair making those calls. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

MR. DAWSON: Thank you. Just a quick question for clarification – do you manage this process you just described?

GEN. SMITH: We execute the process. The process is managed, for instance, in the unit rotation and stuff through the Global Force Management Board, and that is chaired by the joint staff J3, and we're a member of that board, and the services are also members. And so, we are the execution arm of the process.

MR. DAWSON: Second question. What percentage of the forces that are assigned to Central Command go through this process?

GEN. SMITH: Well, everybody – yeah, that's a really good question, because there are service issues as well. For instance, CENTAF at Al Udiad where they have their CAOC, their combined air operations center, where they run the air war – how they fill and man the CAOC is really a service responsibility. So they manage that piece of it for service-specific requirement. What we manage is the joint piece of it, and so for multi-national force Iraq, multi-national corps Iraq, combined force command Afghanistan – we do that piece from a joint perspective. And then those individual augmentees that are going to go into joint jobs that have a joint manning document, then, as of 1 October, we will manage those and have oversight into those individuals. The percentage, I can't tell you exactly. It's the most significant percentage in that the unit manning is certainly the bulk of how we man the theatre, so if you include the unit piece, probably 90 percent.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Stockton.

DONALD STOCKTON: Good morning, sir, and thank you for being with us today and helping to educate us on the things that we need to be focusing on. In your prepared testimony, you said that there are approximately 1.1 million personnel commanded by JFCOM. What part of that would be reserve components?

GEN. SMITH: Oh, that's a good question. Fifty – about 50 percent.

MR. STOCKTON: Fifty percent. I'd like to focus a little bit on the joint professional military education, which I understand the responsibility of – your command is responsible for developing jointness amongst the services. And efforts to provide joint training opportunities to the members of the reserve components are constrained by a shortage of time, joint billets, and joint instruction.

Under the Goldwater-Nichols reforms, reserve officers were required to have a program of joint military education similar to the active components. But the

requirements were not defined. So I'd like to know if you can tell me, please, what efforts have you made to define the requirements for the RC-joint experience and education?

GEN LANCE SMITH: As far as defining for the services or the components exactly what they should do, we have not done that, and said, you need to have this percentage of this or the other. But having said that, we make – I mean, there are clearly slots within all of the colleges, within the joint forces staff college for Guard and reserve members. And that's really determined more from the Guard and reserve leadership than it is by joint forces command.

Now, what we do – and what we're doing – is trying to make sure that the opportunity for joint training is available. And we don't do that through the school system as much as we do through some of the other avenues of distributed learning and the like so that you have joint knowledgeable and capable officers and, interestingly enough, senior enlisted who are probably not surprisingly – given the quality of our force – getting more and more interested in this.

At joint forces command, we have a number of courses that are focused on different levels. We have a keystone course, for instance, that is aimed at senior enlisted, and that course is available to reserves, senior enlisted that anticipate going to be senior enlisted leaders within a joint taskforce or something like that. At the one-star level, capstone – although it's often voluntary because of how the Guard is made up and the time available to them – many Guard and certainly reserves go to that. And we have, at the three-star level, actually a course that's ongoing right now called pinnacle that is designed for those individuals that might go out and be commanders of joint task forces or joint force commanders of some sort. And all of those courses are available to Guard and reserve individuals that are selected by their reserve component commanders to go do those things.

So we try as best we can to make sure that the opportunities are available, but we don't get into the service school systems other than to take a look at what the curriculum is and to ensure that it has the proper joint professional military education piece of it.

MR. STOCKTON: Well, then my follow-on question to that would be, what modifications to the training or instruction of reserve component officers would you recommend to strengthen this joint education process?

GEN. SMITH: Well, I think by virtue of the way we're doing business now, I think the impetus for the services to be more inclusive is there. And because I go out in the field now and you never know who you're going to run into as far as whether it's reserve component or an active component member. I think the nature of things drives us all to try and make the training as equitable as possible. So I would hope without intervention that what will occur naturally through all this process is that all of the slots that the reserve or Guard would like available to them at the Air War College or at the

Army War College would be made available. I think that if we didn't realize it before, I think everybody realizes now that it's an imperative.

Now, I think what the Guard and reserve have to do is make jointness part of the culture, which I think they are clearly doing and moving in that direction. And that it has to be part of the promotion process, where there is value to jointness, which means you not only fulfill the joint jobs, but you get the joint professional military education, whether you do it on your own or go in residence. But there's a two-way street there and it has to be push and pull. And I think the current state of affairs is driving us to do this naturally.

I don't know if I've got the figures to say that, but it would be interesting, and we'll go take a look and just see exactly whether or not there has been a change in presence. I suspect one of the things we'll find – I saw it when I was a commandant of the Air War College – that because of the emphasis that was being put on it certainly within the reserve component – and at the burgeoning, beginning stages of the Guard, the correspondence courses were starting to be subscribed to by Guard and reserve personnel in much larger numbers than they had been maybe four or five years before. So it's a natural movement, and I think it's happening. Maybe not fast enough, and we'll take a look and see what we can find out.

MR. STOCKTON: Thank you, sir.

GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Keane.

MR. KEANE: I'm very familiar with joint forces command, having served there myself. (Inaudible.) I'm sorry. I said, I appreciate your being here, and I'm familiar with joint forces command, having served there myself a number of years ago. And of all the witnesses we've had, I think you're probably in the very unique position to inform us as you already have done, because you cut across the services so much and you're responsible for joint experimentation; you're a joint force provider; you're the joint trainer. And you get to see so many policies, procedures that are in the various services that may have application to all. So in that light, I'd ask you – my first question would be, as you look at the reserve components and what they're doing as a service, is there anything that just pops out at you that would have universal application that would be appropriate for this commission to deal with?

GEN. SMITH: Well, sir, I'd say that what pops out at me is not what needs to be done, but what has been done. I mean, there was a time – I'm an airman, obviously. And there was a time when the Air Force treated its Guard and reserve force considerably different than the other services did. I mean, they were integral to everything that we did. And certainly in mobility command and the like, there is no difference. You can't tell the difference. And some of the other services I think held the Guard and reserve back as strategic reserve and the like.

Well, we're not doing that today. I mean, all of the services are doing exactly what we saw the Air Force doing 20 years ago. And so, I think we have made so much headway in this regard. When I go out – I was recently at 29 Palms, and they're going through some of their buildup, and they have a reserve unit there that was integrated with the active unit, and there were no differences that were visible – no equipment differences, no training differences. They were all going to the same mission. They all knew they were going together. And so, I think that's the thing that stands out the most to me that we've made so much headway in the last three or four years in this regard that I think we get it.

MR. KEANE: Along those lines then, based on your comments, the commission has been asked to take a look at whether we should look at the National Guard Bureau, and the National Guard as a whole, and really set them up as a separate service would be the best way to describe it. In other words, provide them their own budget authority, make the guy who heads it a four-star, put him at the seat around the table with the joint chiefs. Where are you on that?

GEN. SMITH: I can't think of very much positive from my perspective about it. I mean, if you think about my job – and you know my job well – I deal with stovepipes all the time. And the last thing I think we need is another stovepipe. And it's hard enough just to get the four services to integrate. I don't know how we'd work the other. I mean, it would just create more problems, I think, than add solutions to the issues. I think there are a lot of ways to get the Guard more integrally involved. I think one of the things that I need or that we need is more visibility into Guard during their Article 32 time – their Title 32 time – so that we can understand the demands on the Guard and integrate them more into the things we're doing and be able to plan more.

And it is fair to say that we haven't done as much as we could and could do more. And one of the reasons is because of the different missions and the availability and what they're doing. But I think the future for our ability to work with the Guard in training exercises, experimentation, all those things, is really just a matter of commitment. And I don't think the money piece is of great significance. There will be some costs, for instance, and there will be some policies and we'll have to figure out how we want to include the Guard in our joint national training capability, for instance.

As General Boone sets up his state JTF headquarters, I think those are great things. Now, we need to figure out how we can exercise with them, experiment with them, without having to spend billions and billions of dollars to get them these huge networks to every state. I mean, can we do it by region, by training center, or whatever? How do we go about being more inclusive in that? And we just have to work it out with the Guard. Easy for the reserves, because they already participate at the combatant command headquarters and the like; much more difficult for the Guard – but I think there are many ways to get at the perceived problem of integrating the force more than by separating it, and I would not like to see that.

MR. KEANE: Thanks for your response. Let me bring you back to Katrina. I mean, we all know the uniqueness of Katrina because it was a catastrophic disaster where people were dying everyday, a huge tragedy for us. But, you know, the American people look at this thing I think and they have this incredible resource called the United States military. And they watch it fly off around the world to help other people when they are in crisis. And we have this huge crisis in Louisiana and Mississippi right in our doorstep, and we are not able to get the United States military there in time with the right number of people with the appropriate number of resources. At the end of the day, that is exactly what happened. Even a casual observer would come to that conclusion.

So I know we have looked at this thing and I know there is all sorts of issues here. You know, there is title 32, there is title 10, there is guard – federalized yes, federalized not. But at the end of the day, the American people don't care about any of that. And all they want to do is – they know they have got very capable resources here, and when they are in that kind of a crisis where it is an emergency because people are dying and it's beyond first responders and it's beyond the state's resources, in this case two states' resources, they need help. And we know – I mean, given our years of experience, we can provide that help. That is a fact.

So now that we have looked at this thing and it has become a catalyst, energized federal and state governments looking at it, do we – have we got the right lessons learned here and would you share with me what some of them are from a military perspective so it doesn't happen again.

GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. I mean, you know better than I that had we been tasked to respond immediately – I mean, we have got forces that can respond pretty quickly to those sorts of things. And so as we go through our lessons-learned on this, because it never – it really never happened at that level before, we didn't have to – we really didn't have to think about what do you do while you're waiting for the state to determine whether or not they need your capability or not.

I think first of all, what Katrina did is it made us take a look at that and see if that is the right policy. And I think clearly the ability for somebody in the executive branch to be able to mobilize those forces and get them moving quickly, I think there is no question that everyone is leaning forward to be able to respond rapidly. There are always dangers with that. I mean, you can get – you can get the one that gets wiped out if you're too responsive by moving early and moving forward – I mean, you know, you think it's going to hit Biloxi and it hits New Orleans.

So I think that the first and most important thing is that we recognize that there is a responsibility of the military to be prepared and lean forward and expect to be used in a major catastrophe. I think that is very significant.

Now, Admiral Keating – I mean, we have all exercised together on this, as I mentioned. We identified forces across the United States in various stages of readiness for their combat role, but all capable of being able to respond to a domestic catastrophe

kind of role, given hurricane relief or something like that – different levels of capability to handle the chemical biological, radiological – those take some specialized folks, and we are working in making sure that those folks are available as well, and that we have visibility into them which we had some problems with as we went and did some analysis on who is and is not available in the units that are supposed to respond to a weapon of mass destruction.

But I think it's a simple matter of recognizing that we have a role to play leaning forward and being prepared. I mean, my op center calls me and my J3 calls me and we track along with NORTHCOM when a hurricane is out there and where it might hit. And we're talking to units and organizations and all of that stuff to make sure that we are all on the same sheet of music, we are all preparing – and there are issues, as you know, about when we can take actual action, when we can move stuff, who pays for it, and the like, and, you know, when do you make the determination that none of that matters, that as you said, that this is – there is potential for catastrophic, and when it comes to people dying that that is the most important thing in how you go about doing it.

And one of the really – we have developed and it is as a result of Katrina – a web page called Harmony. It is designed for all of the responders, actually anybody that can access this thing, where we have got overhead photos that are in near real time that has people to contact, it has – if you want to send relief supplies, where you – who you talk to – has chat lines so that the FEMA folks can chat, anybody can chat with them and tell them what is going on. We have dedicated and practice with an airborne mobile command post that is capable of taking whoever Admiral Keating wants to take and put them airborne so that we get the communications we need.

I have a joint communications support element down in Tampa that is capable and ready to respond to this kind of thing so that you can get the satellite communications and rapidly rebuild or reconnect those first and second and third responders. And we are training to all of those capabilities so that we don't find ourselves with a responder in Mississippi that can't talk to anybody. I mean, there will be some of that obviously, but we have taken those lessons learned seriously.

I won't say that we have been able to implement every single possible thing in the time allotted to us in a year, but at the same time, we know what needs to be done and we are moving pretty rapidly down the road. And I think we are – well, I don't think – we are in significantly better shape than we were to handle Katrina. And we will continue to get better in this. It is extraordinarily high on our priority list with things to do.

MR. KEANE: Thank you.

MR. DAWSON: Mr. McKinnon.

MR. MCKINNON: General, we are glad you here. Like General Keane says, I think you are one of the most valuable links in the chain of information on the things that we have got to consider and look at. I have got some rather specific questions. Number

one, maybe just following up just for the record, General Keane was talking about the responsibilities that Congress laid on us last weekend about reviewing the guard. The head of the guard is a four star and a member of the joint chiefs. Just to focus in – forget the joint chiefs part of it – do you think it would be helpful if he was a four-star?

GEN. SMITH: I don't know. I don't know what the benefit would be but I don't know what the down side of that would be either. You know, my concern is building a stovepipe, that is my real concern. I think whatever we do, it has to be a situation where the Army guard is part of the Army, the air guard is part of the Air Force, the Navy guard – et cetera, et cetera, and that is the most significant and important part to me.

MR. MCKINNON: Well, it's a tickly situation the Congress has laid on our shoulders, so we are just trying to get a lot of opinions here. And you mentioned a moment ago about all of this jointness. There is a perception in a lot of the guard units and reserves as well that those in that five-sided building across the river have the perception that they are sort of second-class citizens. What can be done to change that image?

GEN. SMITH: First of all, that is a perception.

MR. MCKINNON: But we are hearing it a lot.

GEN. SMITH: I know, but we have always heard that too.

MR. MCKINNON: Out in the field, I know they are out there; everybody is working together, but in the building –

GEN. SMITH: Yeah, I recognize that this is a perception. It is certainly one not I – that I don't share. And frankly, I don't know of anybody that I deal with on a regular basis that does believe that and the reason is because we can't do it – we're doing without them. And so the demonstrated capability and the professionalism and the leadership and the things that the guard are doing today in Iraq, in Afghanistan, in homeland security is demonstrated. And I think that is the key to getting rid of that perception and making sure that the guard is part of the joint force, that they can be used when we need them.

And so I haven't seen it. I don't see it within my command. That is not to say that it doesn't exist, but like I said, we can't do our job without them. I mean, I just – I demonstrated – I told you. I mean, you know, you have got the kind of folks that are sitting behind me that we deal with every day, and they bring us capabilities that are unique. Their dedication, their work ethic represents the guard and reserve wonderfully every day and we all see it every day. Frankly –

MR. MCKINNON: You don't see it?

GEN. SMITH: Well, we don't have a – there is no big G painted on their forehead or an R that is painted on their forehead; they are just great professional officers

and enlisted folks that are part of the total force. And those that don't recognize that and cause that perception to be out there are – they probably out to be doing something else.

MR. MCKINNON: Let me switch subjects a little bit. You are the force provider and the rules of the game are today that the guard is one in six on involuntary manpower support of the war. And the question I have is when do you run out of manpower on the involuntary part of the guard, and that leads into your cross-leveling situation, so I'm just wondering maybe making it simple is how many units do you have nominated for the '07, '09 period you are talking about for deployment because once you run out of the ability to call these fellows to active duty, then you are depending on volunteers. So how is this playing out?

GEN. SMITH: We have one unit in '07-'09, the 218<sup>th</sup>, and I think we had two in 0608. So I mean, it has obviously decreased over time from the early days of OIF and OEF, and that is by brigade combat team. That doesn't mean that the lower-level units, certainly in combat service support and combat support that those flags are still out there. I think there are two battalions that haven't been used, so we don't have – you know, our access is limited and that drives us to I think in the combat service and combat service support role right now about 18 percent of the forces being filled by the reserves, which means that 82 percent is being done by that active force because of the lack of availability of the reserves.

Whether that number of 18 percent will decrease significantly or not, I can't tell you yet. That is the '07-'09, and so I don't know what '08-'10 will bring because – I mean, there is so much great volunteerism that comes out of the Guard and reserve. And plus, there are units that folks have not been mobilized, as those units rebuild and modularize and do all those things, then they become available to us to some degree. But it is a cross-leveling issue that we don't like to do and we don't want to continue doing. So the burden is really on the active force, because we have used the Guard and reserve in such significant numbers.

Having said that, one of our limitations right now is the fact that we have six active duty brigades that are going through rebuild. And those will start to come available to us – we're going to use one of them that was expected to be a little bit later, but the Army is bringing it forward a little bit quicker. We'll be able to use that one in the '07-'09 rotation. And then those other five units will come on board gradually, and as we get back up to 42 available brigade combat teams in the active force that will relieve some of the pressure and the requirement to use the Guard and reserve.

MR. MCKINNON: Are you concerned as we hit this lull of manpower availability of wearing the other forces out who are having to continue?

GEN. SMITH: Yes, sir. I mean, we're all worried about overextending some. The Army is on a one-to-one dwell ratio right now where they're back in the States for a year and will go back over a year after being home for a year. And we are trying to drive to a one-to-two kind of dwell so they're back in the States for two years. And bringing

on the additional brigades will help get us to a 1.5, and then as we work towards trying to get access to the Guard and reserve through some of the things that we talked about earlier where we look at going back to generating units and including the Guard and reserve in the Army specifically force generation model that we can reach a one-to-two dwell time. And that's given an assumption that we're going to keep the same level of requirement in Iraq and Afghanistan and around the world, which may or may not be true.

MR. MCKINNON: Of course that makes it sort of hard on us if you had a surge requirement over in the Middle East, it makes it hard to fulfill that requirement, doesn't it?

GEN. SMITH: Well, I would say that we have pretty good surge capability out there. It is affected by policy, so we'd have to take a look at the law and we'd have to take a look at the policy to be able to get at those units. They will not all be equally prepared. They'll be in some status of readiness. But as often as not, it's not that the forces are not available; it's not as if the forces don't exist. They're not available to us, given the current policies and I have no doubt, in an emergency situation, that they would become available to us.

MR. MCKINNON: Let's talk about another area of the world. There is a lot of political turmoil and weapons acquisitions down in Venezuela and Mexico from the Russians and so on. How would that affect your deployment of forces if you had some folks down there in the future? Do you make – is that a potential threat for you to be considering?

GEN. SMITH: Well, any additional requirements certainly impacts the force pool for sending people to Iraq and Afghanistan. Although, our policies are focused on OIF and OEF so there would be some access to some forces that might not otherwise be available to us. But it would really depend on the kind of forces that we would send down into that region for whatever contingency it happened to be. The heavy forces and stuff are focused mostly in Iraq. I wouldn't expect to use them in a scenario that you mentioned. And our Special Operations forces are also committed mostly into the Central Command theatre of operations, so it could have an impact on them if they were the force of choice.

We do run a regular – when you look at readiness, we have a joint quarterly readiness review where we go look at the readiness numbers for the entire force and every other – we call it a jerker – every other jerker runs against a scenario. The last one we ran against – ran against some events in the States that were going to force NORTHCOM and Homeland Security and those folks to have to respond to some events in the States. And we evaluated the readiness of the forces to be able to do that. The one before that, we looked at our ability to go into another part of the world, and the next one – I believe, the next one is to look at other scenarios along the lines of what you're speaking of. And we'll go evaluate the readiness and what it would mean to the rest of the force, our ability to fulfill our other commitments, against a scenario for a different

combatant commander. And we do that on a regular basis, and the impact that I would say we find on our ability to perform those missions really is less about our ability to succeed than it is about how long it would take.

And so that all depends on the assumptions that are made, but I think in the scenario you described, unless it was something really significant, I don't think it would have a huge impact on what we're trying to do around the world.

MR. MCKINNON: Thank you very much.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Stump.

GORDON STUMP: Good afternoon. Thank you very much for your service and for being here and sharing some time with us. I want just a couple quick questions on the Army force generation model, which says 1-in-6 for the Guard or five on and one on, an 1-in-5, 1-in-6. Is your interpretation of that that the one is actually one year? Based upon what we have seen here, that would only give you seven months on the ground.

GEN. SMITH: That's not how I envision it. All I look at really is the five and the six, which means when they get back, their dwell time is going to be five years, and the dwell time for the Guard is going to be six years. And so, how long they are mobilized for and utilized for, I think I look at it as they are available to be utilized for the 24 consecutive months or cumulative, however that works. But once they come back – once they've been mobilized, deployed, and come back – then we don't have access to them or the Army force generation model wouldn't have access to them for five or six years.

MR. STUMP: I see. Based upon the current level of deployment of the brigade combat teams and what's going on today, does the 1-in-5 – I guess it would just be the Guard, because they're the only ones that have the brigade combat teams – with the 42 in the active duty and the 28 in the National Guard, would you still be able to do that plus the 1-in-3 dwell time for the active duty?

GEN. SMITH: Probably not 1-in – I'd have to run a model like that. But at the current utilization, if we could get it into the force model, I think we can reach – well, I'm not an Army force generation model expert, by the way; I leave that to General McNeill and the Army staff – but my understanding is that given what we just discussed, 1-in-6, 1-in-5 – that we could at least reach a 1-in-2 dwell for the active force, given the current commitment around the world of the brigade combat teams. It may be 1-in-3. Somebody would have to run the model to see. But it is really a 1-in-2 that we're trying to reach for both actually the Army and the Marine Corps – 1-in-3 may be desirable in the long-term.

MR. STUMP: Currently, what sort of guidance are the Marines and the Navy using for where they're attempting to use for their rotation schedule?

GEN. SMITH: Well, the Marines use a – they're on a one-to-one. I think they end up, as we look at it – and again, the one-to-one is not in years; it's in units. And so they deploy for seven months, and get seven months to a year back home. I think the reality is they're getting less than a year back home. So they're very much on the same sort of rotation that the Army is – a unit home, a unit in combat.

MR. STUMP: Is the Air Force using the EAF?

GEN. SMITH: They're using the EAF. Their rotation is on a 120-day rotation, in some cases where it's feasible. They're moving for key and essential jobs into a one-year rotation model, for instance, for key personnel, and at Al-Udeid – one-year model for many of the folks that are key personnel at Balad and Bagram and the like.

MR. STUMP: In your capacity as NATO transformation commander, have you observed how other nations are using their reserve components, and are there any lessons learned we can gain from them?

GEN. SMITH: Actually, we are the model for pretty much everybody in the world. The British have a system that is pretty inclusive. It's not one that I think we could use necessarily. The new countries, as they build their forces – and they're drawing down from very large land armies to much smaller – they are looking to us for how we've established our Guard and reserve relationships for a model. In that hat, I do have insight into how they go about doing business. And when we do have good ideas or good thoughts, I certainly have the capability to bring them back. There are none that I'm aware of as we sit here that really apply or would improve the way we do business today. We do this pretty well.

MR. STUMP: Okay, thank you very much.

MR. DAWSON: Commissioner Ball.

WILLIAM BALL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Smith, before you go, we have to ask you a question about money.

GEN. SMITH: I don't have any.

MR. BALL: Well, now that could be a problem. Part of our assessment is to get into the adequacy of funding for the National Guard and reserve components, and we've had testimony from the reserve component chiefs in July where they said in essence that they had adequate funding at this time. But we've also heard from others, specifically a number of governors who have attested to shortfalls in equipment for returning National Guard units, and of course, there is a history of congressional add-ons for the Guard and reserve over the years. Back when in pre-9/11 day we had more tiered system of readiness. So from your perspective, my question is what have you seen in terms of readiness, equipping, and training levels that are indicative of inadequacy of funding, and

are there any areas where shortfalls for the foreseeable future are acute that you think we should address?

GEN. SMITH: I think probably in the equipment field more than any other area is where we see – I don't want to say major concerns – and it's not just the reserve component; it's the active force too. As we go through these models of mobilization and training and all of that, regardless of what your dwell time is, as you get prepared to go into the conflict, all of the readiness indicators generally improve as you get closer to going. The last one that is usually turned to green, or C1 if you will, is the equipment – or actually it's the supply line, which means the amount of equipment you have. And part of the reason – and it affects I think the Guard and reserve perhaps more than it does the active forces because so many of the equipment that they're going to use is stay-behind equipment that is in theatre – so there are some things like simcards, radios, armored Humvees, and the like that would be nice to be able to train on daily basis that may not be available to every unit back in the States.

But having said that, the spin-up and the training and everything else prior to going is pretty good, and we account for those shortages before they get into theatre. In a perfect world with unlimited money, it would be nice to have all the equipment you need back home to be able to train everybody on all of the time. How realistic that is, I'm not sure. You know, the equipment is over there. The equipment is ready for them to be used. We run them through depot in Kuwait and other places before a unit comes on board, and so, in some of those early instance, when you heard the huge complaints about not having enough up-armored Humvees, that was the unit as it existed in Kuwait. But the minute they showed up in place in Iraq, they had 150 percent of the requirement, because of the stay-behind equipment over there.

So the issue really, I think, is more in training and making sure that they have the equipment they need to be able to train properly. And then the other is how do we treat this force as operational reserve versus strategic reserve and what would you expect it to do otherwise. And so, I think that's where I would look at improving capability and putting my money if that's what I had money to do.

MR. BALL: Well, thank you sir. General Jones made a statement – used a phrase in his statement we've heard before. He referred to the labyrinth of duty statuses for reservists and Guardsmen that now serves as a major impediment to accessing operational and support forces. And we heard last night from the First Army commander, General Honoré a similar complaint. You make reference to your responsibilities in your opening statement about opening changes in doctrine, organization, training personnel, et cetera. So my question is simply, do you have specific recommendations that you have sent to the Defense Department or this commission that would address this labyrinth of duty statuses issue? And if you haven't made one yet, could you confer with us in the months ahead, because some of us think this is a key issue and perhaps we can play a role here in –

GEN. SMITH: I have not made such a recommendation and would be glad to collaborate with the commission on it. I mean, the nice thing about how we operate is I have regular meetings with our components and this is a great issue to throw on the table and make a discussion topic and get what recommendations we can from the folks that actually do this on a daily basis and see how it really impacts.

I mean, Jim Honoré is part of forces command and so his input into that will be important. And I would be glad to look at it. It's a very logical thing to do. We'll take a look.

MR. BALL: Thank you sir.

MR. DAWSON: Well, General Smith, I want to thank you for your calm with us today. I actually want to thank you for doing your duty for our country for as many years as you have. I want to thank you for bringing your colleagues along to show us what you're doing. And it was a very impressive performance. We are much better for it, and I want to thank you for how the breadth of your knowledge and experience was clearly demonstrated. So with that, I will adjourn the hearing until the call of the chair.

GEN. SMITH: Thank you, sir, and we very much look forward to working together on this. I think it's extraordinarily important what you're doing.

(END)