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STATEMENT BY

THE HONORABLE FRANCIS J. HARVEY  
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

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Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Commission, on behalf of the over 1 million US Army Soldiers and their families, I want to thank you for the opportunity to testify on matters related to the Army National Guard and Reserve. These issues are of critical importance to the United States Army, because we are fighting the Global War on Terror with our Army National Guard and Army Reserve as an integral part of our operational force, in contrast to the strategic reserve role that they have had in previous conflicts. Consequently, to meet the sustained global demand for Army forces, and to establish acceptable levels of readiness across the force, we must have recurrent, assured, and predictable access to cohesive Army Reserve and the Army National Guard units.

The media widely reported the observation that the Global War on Terror has now lasted longer than the Second World War. But they are measuring the Long War using the wrong yardstick. The Cold War, which pitted political, ideological, and economic adversaries against each other for over 45 years, would be a more appropriate comparison. This war is a protracted test of ideologies, against an enemy whose stated intention is nothing less than to destroy our free and democratic way of life.

To meet the security threats of the 21st Century, the *National Defense Strategy*, which was updated during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), directed the Army to have a total of 18 to 19 Brigade Combat Teams, plus support brigades, available for deployment at all times. Based on the QDR demand for forces, coupled with the fact that the active component is nearly 35% smaller than it was just 15 years ago<sup>1</sup>, the Army is transitioning the reserve component from a strategic reserve to an operational force, with plans to meet the QDR demand through a combination of active, guard and reserve forces. Furthermore,

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<sup>1</sup> Active Army end strength was 1.365M in 1970, 748k in 1990, and 493K in 2005

both existing and projected demand for Army forces significantly exceeds the QDR-directed baseline levels, which further reinforces the need for an operational reserve component. Finally, to manage the force in the most effective and efficient manner, we are employing a rotational management process we call the Army Force Generation model, or ARFORGEN. Through this process, units are systematically and progressively made ready for deployment in a way that reduces stress and allows us to sustain the Army for the Long War. For all of the above reasons, we must have recurrent, assured and predictable access to reserve component units. Simply put, it is an *operational necessity*.

In response to the change to an operational force, the Army, as part of "The Army Plan," is rapidly transforming and modernizing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in a manner consistent with the active component. We are fundamentally changing the way we organize, train, and equip our reserve component force.

In terms of organizing, we are transforming all components to a modular design as well as rebalancing skills across the total force to ensure we have the right type of units and Soldiers. We are building a pool of 76 brigade combat teams (BCTs) and over 225 support brigades across the three components. We have completed the conversion of 31 brigades into BCTs, and we are currently in the process of converting 20 more, including 16 Army National Guard brigades. The end state of this process will be a fully manned, trained, and equipped force with comparable structure, equipment and capabilities balanced between the active and reserve components.

In terms of training, we recognize that our rebalancing efforts have created a number of reserve units whose Soldiers are no longer considered qualified for their military occupational specialties (MOS). For example, Soldiers who once were qualified field artillerymen are now military policemen. To meet this need, we have significantly increased the number of seats in MOS-qualifying schools that are allocated to the

reserve components. In FY04, the Reserve Components were allocated 64,139 seats; in FY07 we increased this allocation to 82,390 seats for the Reserve Components. This is a 28% increase in only three years. We are also developing more efficient ways to conduct unit training. We recognize the need to execute as much training as possible prior to mobilizing a unit. We must ensure that we are using our reserve component's mobilized time defending the Nation, rather than conducting training that could have been accomplished at home station. Central to this effort is a reassessment of the number of training days our reserve component commanders will need to accomplish training at home, rather than after mobilization.

We are also equipping our reserve component forces at the highest investment levels in history. Previously, to prepare reserve units for deployment, we had to pool personnel and equipment from across the force. Today we have fielded new Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) tanks, howitzers, and communications equipment to the National Guard. The reserve components are receiving our best night vision equipment, GPS receivers, battle command equipment, and trucks. Given the National Guard's role as both an operational force and the States' first military responder for homeland defense and civil support, the Army is committed to resource the Army National Guard consistent with those roles. For instance, we worked closely with the National Guard leadership to identify dual use equipment in their "essential 10" capabilities. We have since fenced more than \$21 billion for ground systems procurement and \$1.9 billion in aviation equipment in fiscal years 2005 through 2011 – greater than a four-fold increase over fiscal years 2003 to 2009. In close collaboration with the National Guard, we also fielded more than 11,000 pieces of critical equipment to priority hurricane states. The Army Reserve remains the Nation's first Title 10 responder to provide assistance in serious natural or manmade disasters, accidents, or catastrophes that occur in the United States and its territories. To ensure

they can meet these responsibilities we have fenced \$3.9 billion for Army Reserve procurement in fiscal years 2005 through 2011.

The Commission asked me to testify on fifteen specific questions related to H.R. 5200 and S. 2658. Today I stand at the end of a long line of witnesses with the same message; the legislation that the commission is evaluating is, at best, unnecessary. It would confuse command and control relationships and lines of authority that the Department has formed over the past 20 years since Goldwater-Nichols was enacted. I believe that the legislation stems from decades of neglect of the needs of our reserve forces. This partially resulted from a strategy that was based on using the reserve components as a strategic reserve. However, just as our strategy has dramatically changed, so has the Department's entire approach to organizing, training, and equipping our reserve forces. As the Secretary of the Army, I am Secretary of the Total Army – with responsibility for the Active, Guard, and Reserve. The proposed changes in organization and responsibilities would make it difficult for me to execute my duties under Title X of the United States Code. Quite frankly the proposed solution is intended to solve a problem that does not exist. Today's total Army is the best in the world, and the changes I have previously described in our overall approach optimizes the way we recruit, organize, man, train, equip, sustain and station the Total Army.

The door between my office and General Schoomaker's opens and closes several times each day, as we work together to lead this magnificent Army. We consult and discuss regularly, and there is no space between us on any issue. General Schoomaker testified before this commission on December 14<sup>th</sup>, 2006, and he offered three options for relieving the operational stress on our Army. General Schoomaker's testimony before this commission is completely consistent with recent announcements by the President and the Secretary of Defense regarding endstrength and mobilization policy, which in turn reinforce the rationale for the Chief's comments.

General Schoomaker asked for the Commission's support to adjust the policies necessary to enable recurrent, assured, and predictable access to the 55 percent of the Army that resides in the reserve components. I believe that the Reserve mobilization policy changes announced by Secretary Gates on January 11<sup>th</sup> will provide the access we need.

The first aspect of the policy change will involve the way the department manages deployments of reserve forces. Currently, reserve deployments are managed on an individual basis. In the future deployments will be managed on unit basis, allowing for greater unit cohesion and predictability for training and deployments. This will provide the combatant commander with cohesive units that have a long-term relationship and continuity of leadership. Units will train as a team, deploy as a team, and fight as a team.

The second aspect of the policy change addresses the maximum mobilization time for members of the reserve forces. Currently, the policy results in a mobilization time of 18 to 24 months. We will reduce this timeframe to one year. Prior to this announcement all Army units served for one year with "boots on the ground." Once mobilization, training, deployment, and remobilization activities were added, our reserve forces were mobilized, or had their "boots out of the living room," for 18 to 24 months. In the future, units will be mobilized for a total of 12 months, and serve in the theater of operations for less than that.

Third, the mobilization objective for Guard and Reserve units will remain one year mobilized followed by five years demobilized. However, today's global demand for Army forces will require selected reserve force units to be remobilized sooner than the current policy goal. That deployment-to-demobilization ratio remains our goal, as does the active component's ratio goal of one year of deployment to two years at home station during periods of high demand.

Fourth, we will establish a new program to compensate individuals in both active and reserve component forces that are required to mobilize earlier than, or deploy more than established policy goals.

Fifth, we will review our hardship waiver programs to ensure we have properly accounted for the exceptional circumstances that extended and repetitive deployments create for our Soldiers and their families.

Finally, we will develop plans to minimize the use of stop loss for all components.

Changing these policies is the most efficient and effective way to reduce the stress on the force and to generate the ground forces necessary to meet the combatant commanders' operational requirements, and to defend our Nation. If we do not have recurrent, assured, and predictable access to the reserve components, we will have to fundamentally reconsider the organizing, training, and equipping strategy that I have just described. It makes no sense to invest all of the associated resources into a force that you cannot access.

General Schoomaker also emphasized to the Commission the criticality of growing the Army's endstrength, most importantly the active component. The President recently announced his decision to grow the Army from the current baseline of 482,400. The details of that growth are as follows: first, the temporary growth of the Army of 30,000 Soldiers above the current baseline, which was previously approved by the President and authorized by Congress, will now become permanent and, second, in FY08, we will grow the Active Army at the rate of approximately 7,000 Soldiers per year for the succeeding 5 years for a total of 35,000 additional Soldiers. When we are done, we will have grown the Army by 65,000 Soldiers – from 482,400 to 547,400. This growth is absolutely required to be able to provide the forces necessary to fight this Global War on Terrorism.

Finally, I want to recognize the contributions of our citizen-Soldiers in the current fight. To date over 430,000 Army National Guard and Army

Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized since 9/11; of that total 271,000, or approximately 35% of the total number of Soldier deployments, have been into overseas theaters of operation. They have performed their missions at home and around the world in an outstanding fashion, shoulder to shoulder with their active component counterparts. Whether they responded to their “Call to Duty” in OIF, OEF, Airport Security, Hurricane Katrina, the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Balkans, Sinai, or Pakistani earthquake relief, our reserve components have performed superbly. During my time as the Secretary, I have visited Soldiers all over the world. It never ceases to amaze me where I meet our citizen-Soldiers – from the flooded streets of New Orleans to the Al Anbar Province of Iraq and the mountains of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, another place that I see them alongside their active duty comrades is during my frequent visits to Walter Reed Army Medical Center. We must never forget the sacrifices that all of our Soldiers are making in this war, regardless of their component.

I will conclude by saying that the United States Army has never failed the Nation, and it never will. Our Nation is counting on us, and we will continue to operate as a Total Force able to meet the full spectrum of operations – now and into the future. I look forward to answering your questions.