

STATEMENT BY

LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES J. LOVELACE, JR.
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G3, UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

12 APRIL 2007

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Commission, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about our Army, and specifically about the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. On behalf of our Acting Secretary, Mr. Pete Geren, our new Chief, General George Casey, and the approximately one million active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers that comprise the Army – more than 130,000 of whom are serving in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom today – I welcome the opportunity to discuss the changes being considered or previously implemented by DOD to make the Reserve Components (RC) a fully operational part of our total Army effort in this long war. In the end, I want to leave you with an appreciation of the three major hurdles that we have to overcome to reach our envisioned endstate for the RC: funding to fully modernize and train the RC; mobilization policy and implementation guidance that allows for assured and predictable access commensurate with our force generation concept; and most importantly, a recognition by our political leadership, Soldiers, families and our nation of the changed role of the reserve component as part of the operational force pool.

The Reserve Components play a vital role in our national defense. The U.S. military cannot fight a large-scale conflict today without relying on the National Guard units and the Reserves. The RC provides the campaign quality—the staying power—to our total force. Without their contribution, the Army does not have the strategic depth to sustain a protracted campaign to secure enduring victory in this long war. The Army has embraced this paradigm and is well on the way in implementing a plan to make this a reality. The changes we are making today are in the program and *will* get us to our long term vision of the RC as part of the operational force pool. Much work lies ahead as we are closer to the beginning of our plan than the end. *These changes will take time and more rapid change will require additional fiscal resources to accomplish.*

In order to understand where our Army is going as a total force, it is necessary to understand where we were 35 years ago and where we stand today. America still relies on a "Total Force Concept" that was initiated in the 1970s to integrate the active and reserve components of the armed forces. President Richard Nixon's Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, created the concept to reduce defense expenditures for the Vietnam War and streamline the services while maintaining the nation's global military commitments. Laird sought to integrate all elements of the armed forces seamlessly into

a military complex and increase the reserve component's readiness, training, and equipment levels for combat and combat support services.

Today's reserve components hardly resemble the reserve components of the Cold War, which were – by design – principally elements of the Nation's strategic reserve. During this period of time that extended through the 1990s, Reserve Component equipping and mobilization policies were framed based on assumptions that in times of crisis, there would be sufficient warning and time to mobilize, fill the ranks, and then get the country on a war footing to fill any material shortages. This strategy assumed that the Active Component would be large enough to sustain the fight with forward deployed forces, first deployers, and pre-positioned stocks, until the strategic reserve was committed to the theater of war. Later deploying AC forces and the RC were resourced at lower levels than most active component units—it was where DOD assumed risk.

The Army of 1970 was twice as large as the force we have today with over two million men and women in uniform; 1.36 million in the active component and 667,000 in the reserve components. Over the next decade and a half, the Army reduced its total end strength by over a half-million Soldiers, without fundamentally readdressing the assumptions that we used to resource the force. Although we continued to resource the first-deployers at high levels, the shrinking defense budgets, declining force structure, and increasing U.S. force role in peacekeeping missions, resulted in even greater reliance on the reserve component for meeting day-to-day missions. During this period, the serious under-investment in the sustainment and modernization of the total force put the Army in a position of un-readiness when 9/11 occurred.

Today, the active Army, at just over 500,000 Soldiers, is less than 40 percent of its size 35 years ago. The confluence of the substantially decreased size of the active component combined with the increased global demands of this long war, require the reserve components to fill a much larger and more active part of the operational force pool. As a result, our reserve component forces are no longer a strategic reserve, but an operational force required to meet the demands of the 21st Century security environment. We have determined the size of all three components based on these conditions and we have re-balanced our capabilities in combat, combat support, and combat service support correspondingly. This shift in force resourcing strategy has

required us to change the way the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve are organized, resourced, trained, and mobilized.

The global threat environment has changed and we must change with it. Our forces must be able to fight under a variety of circumstances, so we have to organize and train to meet the full spectrum of challenges. As part of “The Army Plan,” the Army is rapidly transforming and modernizing the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve in a manner consistent with active component units. We are also equipping our reserve component forces at the highest investment levels in history. The Army has achieved an unprecedented level of total force integration since 9/11. It takes the total Army – Active, Guard, and Reserve – to generate and sustain the forces required to wage the Global War on Terror and fulfill global operational requirements. These efforts will make RC units organizationally interchangeable with their active component counterparts.

The Army is committed to resourcing the Army National Guard consistent with its dual roles as part of the operational force pool and the States’ first military responder for homeland defense and civil support. Last year, the Army fenced \$21 billion for National Guard ground equipment and another \$1.9 billion for aviation for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2011. National Guard equipment funding has increased from \$5B (99-05) to almost \$36 billion over 05-13. Today, we have fielded new Abrams Integrated Management (AIM) tanks, howitzers, and communications equipment to the National Guard, in addition to providing thousands of pieces of critical equipment to priority hurricane states in preparation for the upcoming hurricane season this year (more than 11,000 last year). Although the Army does not procure equipment specifically for Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions, it does recognize that the highest priority for National Guard units is critical “dual use” equipment and works to field them this equipment first.

The Army Reserve remains the Nation’s primary Title 10 responder to provide assistance in natural or manmade disasters, accidents, or catastrophes that occur in the United States and its territories. To ensure they can meet these responsibilities we have fenced \$1.9 billion for Army Reserve procurement in fiscal years 2005 through 2011. The reserve components are also receiving our best night vision equipment, GPS receivers, battle command equipment, and trucks, among other items. Our current planned fiscal commitment to fully equip, train and man the USAR is unprecedented—over \$9.6 billion to between FY07 and FY13.

We are transforming all components to a modular design as well as rebalancing skills across the total force to ensure we have the right type of units and Soldiers. We are building a pool of 76 brigade combat teams (BCTs) (48 AC and 28 ARNG) and over 200 support brigades across the three components (144 RC planned). We completed the conversion of 31 AC brigades to BCTs by the end of FY 2006 and we began the conversion of 16 Army National Guard (ARNG) brigades to BCTs. In FY 2007, we will complete the conversion of 3 more AC brigades to BCTs and initiate the conversion of 9 more ARNG brigades to BCTs (the first 7 ARNG brigades will complete their conversion in FY 2009). We are also developing plans to rebalance 6 ARNG brigades to 6 combat support brigade (maneuver enhancement) that will meet the Army's wartime requirements and provide capabilities well suited to the ARNG's homeland missions. By FY 2013, we will complete the conversion of all 76 brigades with a fully manned, trained, and equipped force comprised of comparable structure, equipment and capabilities balanced between the active and reserve components.

Hand-in-hand with our modular conversion and restructuring, we have implemented the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model to prioritize resources, synchronize the cyclic readiness of all Army forces, better manage the available force pool, and provide some measure of predictability to our all-volunteer force. Our goal is to generate a continuous output of fully manned, equipped, and trained forces adequate to sustain one operational deployment in three years for the active component, one in six years for the RC. With the additional growth announced by the President and the Secretary of Defense in January 2007, we will be able to maintain a continuous supply of up to 21 BCTs in the available force pool by FY 2012 and meet the requirements outlined in the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review. Sustaining this level of effort requires the availability of up to five Army National Guard BCTs during each ARFORGEN cycle and the associated combat support and combat service support units; many of which are provided by the reserve components.

The Army has a well orchestrated plan to reach its transformation objectives by the end of the program, *but we must meet today's demands with the force we currently have*. Over the last five years, the sustained strategic demand of deployed combat brigades and other supporting units has placed a strain on the Army's all-volunteer force, now being tested for the first time in an extended period of conflict. These demands have exposed the years of insufficient modernization and manpower investment

decisions in the years during the 1990s, as well as the excessive over structure in the Reserve Components.

While we deploy the best manned, trained and equipped forces in to combat, we have to pool equipment from across the force to equip these forces and meet Combatant Commanders' wartime requirements. Although absolutely necessary to support Soldiers deploying into harm's way, this practice has increased the un-readiness in our-next-to-deploy forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies. The RC has borne their share of this equipment burden and we have made a commitment to replacing RC equipment that is outdated, has been left behind in theater, short, or cross-leveled to other units. This effort is in direct competition with other resource demands such as sourcing the warfight, re-building Army Pre-positioned Stocks and equipping accelerated brigade combat teams builds. As a percentage of their total equipment requirements, the ARNG has provided five percent of their equipment to theater and the Army Reserve has provided two percent of their equipment to theater. The impact is larger than the percentages might indicate because it was their best and most modern equipment that was left behind.

The Army is currently validating and working payback actions (DODD 1225.6) for Reserve Component equipment left in theater for follow-on units. In addition, the FY 2007 Supplemental provides \$3.4 billion to the RC for reset to include replacing critical warfighting equipment such as trucks, radios, engineering equipment, trailers and generators that were left in theater to support deploying forces and Homeland Defense and Homeland Security missions. This will take several years to complete at the current rate. The Army will work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense to identify and acquire the requisite funding to meet planned total force equipping purchases by FY13 and to complete fielding by FY15.

After the recent QDR, the DoD adopted a supply-based strategy and sized the force in a way that requires all Army components to be operationally available as part of the operational force pool. We therefore sized our AC and RC components with the expectation that we would have access to the total force as appropriate to meet the demand. Until Secretary Gate's new Total Force Utilization Policy, we have not had a re-mobilization policy that allows us that access and the restrictive policies regarding use of the RC have led to an ever increasing reliance on the AC to meet the global

demands. These policies resulted in a decrease in dwell time between deployments for active brigade combat teams from over 18 months two years ago, to about one year today. These mobilization policies and practices have decimated the cohesion of our RC forces. All reserve component units have been either partially or completely mobilized in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Because our RC units were under-manned to begin with, they had to rely on volunteers and extensive cross-leveling from other units to fill their ranks. After over five years of war, this borrow and fill approach has taken its toll on the force and runs counter to the military necessity of deploying trained, ready, and cohesive units.

In terms of training, we recognize that our reorganization and rebalancing efforts have created a number of reserve component units where a large percentage of Soldiers are not MOS qualified. Soldiers who once were qualified field artillerymen now may find themselves as military policemen. Even with these organizational changes, we have continued to increase the overall number of MOS qualified Soldiers in the RC. Since 2001, percentage of MOS qualified RC Soldiers has actually risen from 71% to 77%, but the 23% non-MOS qualified number equals over 122,000 Soldiers that require training. To meet this need, we have significantly increased the number of seats in MOS-qualifying schools that are allocated to the reserve components. In FY04, the Reserve Components were allocated 64,139 seats in MOS-qualifying schools. By comparison, in FY07 we allocated 82,390 seats to the Reserve Components—a 28% investment increase in MOS-qualifying training in only three years.

We recognize that in order for our citizen Soldiers to maximize their time at home and work, we need to execute as much training as possible prior to mobilizing a unit. *Therefore, we will work with OSD to secure the funding and implementation policies to allow us to achieve the required amount of pre-mobilization training.* This will ensure that we are using our reserve component's mobilized time defending the Nation, rather than conducting training that could have been accomplished at home station. Central to this effort is a reassessment of the number of training days our reserve component commanders will need prior to vice following mobilization. This shift in training and force readiness will come at a price.

Mobilization policies have been adjusted in a way that allows recurrent, assured, and predictable access to the 55 percent of the Army that resides in the reserve

components. This access must be commensurate with the AC and RC contribution proportions envisioned in the ARFORGEN plan—if demand for forces increases, the supply must increase across all components proportionally. The global demand currently exceeds the established force generation goals and there is no indication that it will appreciably decline in the immediate future. *Our organizing, training, and equipping strategy is predicated on assured and predictable access to the reserve components the Army was granted.* It makes no sense to invest in a portion of the force that we cannot access.

Finally and most importantly, our political leadership, Soldiers, families and, our nation must come to an understanding of the changed role of the reserve component. As a part of the operational force pool, RC units will no longer deploy every now and again; they must be ready for deployment every five years—our nation requires it. Additionally, to meet the 12 month mobilization policy, we must carefully examine and potentially change our training strategy to ensure that Soldiers are trained and ready for deployment. This level of effort will redefine how our citizen Soldiers, their families and their employers view their commitment. Is this force ready for this kind of volunteerism? What effect will have on the recruiting, retention and ultimately the viability of our reserve components? This Commission and the civilian leadership of our nation must examine these questions very carefully. This is a fundamental change in how we have viewed the contribution of the RC. The Army and the Commission must carry this message forward.

In closing, the work of this Commission and its recommendations are critical to our ability to sustain this long war. I want to re-emphasize what our former Chief General Schoomaker once said: “This is not about maintaining this All-Volunteer Force, it’s about preserving the next All-Volunteer Force.” Our Reserve Components are an integral part of our force and our strategy. They perform their missions at home and around the world in a superb fashion, shoulder to shoulder with their active component counterparts. “When you call out the Guard and Reserve, you call out America.” Whether they responded to their “Call to Duty” in OIF, OEF, Airport Security, Hurricane Katrina, the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Balkans, Sinai, or Pakistani earthquake relief, our reserve components have performed magnificently. *In order to fully achieve and sustain our vision of a balanced total force, with both active and*

reserve components as part of the operational force pool, we must have the requisite funding, policies, and recognition of their changed role in our total force strategy. I thank you again for the opportunity to discuss this critical topic and I look forward to answering your questions.